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InTRoDUCTIon
The occupants of Zhongnanhai–the central headquarters of the Communist 
Party and the State Council in Beijing–might have wished for a better ‘Year of 
the Pig’. The trade war with the United States through 2019 has escalated into 
an existential struggle defined on both sides by words such as ‘containment’ 
and ‘decoupling’. And even though China’s economy has stabilised after a 
sharp slowdown in the 2018/19 winter thanks to new stimulus measures, it 
is still fragile and faces important structural challenges in the next few years 
that could have pronounced political implications. 
An unusual outpouring of dissent and criticism at home about the path and 
policies that Xi’s China has chosen has become more prevalent. Pushback 
abroad, not least in Hong Kong, also poses awkward issues for the 
government. One leading expert on the Chinese Communist Party has even 
argued that Xi Jinping’s overreach may come back to haunt him before the 
20th party Congress, in late 2022.1
These phenomena are occurring at an important time, as party officials 
prepare for the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic 
on 1 October 2019. China’s craving for stability is normal, but especially 
pronounced now with the unrest in Hong Kong, and in the future ahead of the 
next major anniversary, in 2021, when it will commemorate the centenary of 
the Communist Party. These and other official anniversaries are important 
political events that are about the narrative of the party’s historically enabling 
role and legitimacy. There is no space for instability or threat. 
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SUCCESSES 
As the next decade draws closer, the party will certainly be 
able to boast two key objectives: the elimination of poverty, 
and the establishment of China as a middle income country, 
aligned with a pledge to double income per head in the 
decade to 2020.
According to the World Bank, the number of Chinese 
residents living in rural areas in extreme poverty (less than 
$1.90 a day in 2011 purchasing power terms) had fallen to 
700,000 by 2015, compared with over 750 million in 1990.2 
Using less restrictive measures of poverty, China’s poor may 
still be counted in tens or hundreds of millions, but there 
is no doubt that the government will claim it has ticked an 
important box of developmental progress. 
In 1990, China was still classified as a poor country with 
income per head of only $348, or just 1.5 per cent of what 
it was in the United States. In 2019, China’s upper middle 
income status is secure with income per head estimated by 
the IMF at just over $10,000. This is still only 15.5 per cent 
of the United States level, but it is nonetheless a remarkable 
achievement. The pledge to double income per head 
between 2010 and 2020 has all but been fulfilled. Something 
quite dramatic would have to happen in the next year for this 
pledge to fail.
Yet, the party’s narrative now faces an important reckoning 
for two reasons. First, the consequences of its governance 
system for maintaining stability, control and fealty within 
its borders and stable political relations outside. Second, 
its capacity to achieve a persistently high and stable rate of 
economic growth, currently targeted at about 6 per cent, as 
a proxy for high rates of employment growth. Indeed, China’s 
growth rate is likely to slide in the 2020s to a more sustainable 
rate of 3-4 per cent, and there’s a sporting chance that China 
will not become the world’s largest economy after all.
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In these and other respects, China is 
increasingly hostage to events, some of 
which are conspiring against it, including 
the White House’s relentless pursuit of trade 
policies that have brought China and the 
United States into conflict, and the upheavals 
in Hong Kong. The consequences of both will 
weigh on Beijing policy-makers for some time.
ExTERnAl EvEnTS
The American political thinker, Edward 
Luttwak once described trade conflict 
between the United States and Europe and 
Japan several decades ago as ‘The logic of 
conflict is the grammar of commerce’. This 
turn of phrase could not be more apt for 
the current state of China-US relations. The 
trade war is, of course, about trade, but deep 
down, it is also about China’s technology 
and industrial policies, and the struggle for 
technological dominance in commercial and 
military spheres. 
In contrast to trade in, say, steel or soyabeans, 
though, technology is a genuinely global 
industry, which is China-centric, and features 
high levels of integration and extensive supply 
chains that cross national boundaries and 
connect companies all over the world. It is a 
systemic industry, not unlike global finance 
in 2008, fissures within which are likely to 
have far-reaching implications for China’s 
economy and for the rest of the world. 
Against this background, the escalation of 
the trade war from punitive tariffs to include 
greater scrutiny over foreign investment, and, 
in the summer of 2019, the establishment by 
both sides of so-called ‘entity lists’ that target 
companies marked a serious deterioration 
in Sino-US relations. While China and the US 
both have opinion formers or officials who 
still want to rebuild trust and re-establish a 
viable co-existence, they also have those who 
favour ‘decoupling’ and greater ‘self-reliance’. 
For them, the trade war is about politics, 
specifically about different perceptions of 
fairness, standards and beliefs.
The trade war had not had a big impact on 
China’s economy until the White House’s 
new tariff measures came into effect in 
September 2019. Yet, virtually the whole of 
China-US trade is now subject to punitive 
tariffs, and economic reports and surveys 
by some banks suggest that trade conflict is 
affecting export and industrial firms, and jobs. 
The cumulative impact of punitive US tariffs 
may be to take about 0.75-1.25 per cent 
off China’s economic growth rate over the 
coming 12-18 months. There will also be 
secondary effects on the value of the Yuan, 
and as global and Chinese firms rethink 
their China-centric supply chains, and look 
elsewhere for political and policy certainty 
and the ability to compete effectively. 
The Yuan has already slipped back to levels 
not seen for over a decade, and China will 
have to pay close attention to its currency 
for fear that untoward weakness or policy 
miscalculations trigger additional weakness 
and the risk of higher capital outflows. Surveys 
published by large banks and the American 
and EU Chambers of Commerce in China 
in 2019 reported that between a fifth and 
third of companies had already moved some 
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supply chain operations to other nations, 
with comparable proportions indicating that 
they planned to do so in the future.
However the Chinese and US governments 
manage the trade-specific aspects of their 
conflict this year or in 2020, the fundamental 
aspects of their misaligned interests 
nowadays are most likely to persist, with 
adverse economic consequences for the 
foreseeable future.
A more immediate challenge for Beijing 
is playing out on the streets of Hong 
Kong, which it would certainly want to see 
pacified before the 1 October anniversary 
celebrations. Yet, there is a myriad of reasons 
why China might not want to intervene 
directly, even though some observers have 
raised, for understandable reasons, echoes 
of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.3 
Hong Kong has a population of 7 million, a 
larger and far more complicated geography, 
and a people who have familiarity with the 
rule of law and democratic institutions, 
and resent local dysfunctional government 
and restricted opportunity. Although Hong 
Kong is small in the context of China’s $13 
trillion economy, it still packs a powerful 
punch in terms of financial services. It is the 
mainland’s window to global finance and vice 
versa. It is still a rule of law territory, famed 
for the quality of its regulatory oversight, low 
taxation, and free movement of capital, and 
for the talent that has flocked there to build 
the most mature and sophisticated money 
and capital markets in Asia.
It is a crucial conduit of foreign capital into 
Chinese securities markets, especially of 
foreign borrowing in US dollars on which 
China is becoming more dependent, and 
of inward foreign investment. Almost half 
of inward investment into China comes 
from Hong Kong as Chinese firms use the 
advantages enjoyed by Hong Kong as a 
base from which to invest in the mainland. 
The local stock exchange may now be 
dwarfed by the exchanges in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, but its capitalisation is still the 
fourth largest in the world, and the third 
largest in Asia, after China and Tokyo. About 
half the companies listed on the exchange 
are mainland companies, which raised 
more capital there in 2018 than firms did on 
Wall Street. 
If, as seems likely now, Hong Kong loses 
its prized status, direct intervention or not, 
China is at risk of losing many ancillary 
services that make finance for China’s 
enterprise and investment work, such as 
law, capital raising, securities structuring 
and trading, accounting, and fintech.
In any event, the signalling impact of 
developments in Hong Kong to voters in 
Taiwan, which holds presidential elections in 
January 2020, is already important. Opinion 
polls indicate a rise in support for the 
incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen, whose 
campaign embraces antipathy to the ‘one 
country, two systems’ slogan. If re-elected, 
Taiwan’s political distance from China 
would increase, and present President Xi 
Jinping, for whom an important legacy is the 
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peaceful re-unification of the ‘renegade province’ with the 
mainland, with a new and sensitive problem.
China’s broader international relations in the 2020s, 
moreover, are likely to become more challenging as a 
result of already existing criticism in several Belt and 
Road countries about corruption, over-charging, lack of 
transparency and accountability, poor environmental 
standards, and contentious attitudes and practices. Some 
Southeast Asian nations are considering the balance 
between their economic interests with China and their 
security interests with America.4 Several countries have 
re-negotiated or cancelled Belt and Road projects, and 
President Xi even acknowledged in 2019 that some Belt 
and Road programmes could now be scaled back or 
joined by other countries, global financial institutions and 
financial centres. This may prove difficult to accomplish 
because the Belt and Road is, in effect, an extension of 
the domestic model of how banks, state enterprises and 
local governments do infrastructure business in China. 
Criticisms are not so much about unforeseen or random 
errors as much harder governance features.
 
MAnAGInG ThE EConoMy 
Under President Xi Jinping’s governance regime, China has 
had to embrace tight party discipline and social control, 
the suppression of internal dissent and division, the 
substitution of party cadres and agencies for technocrats 
and state institutions in the origination and implementation 
of policy, total control over the communications, academic 
and legal systems, and a relentless and extensive anti-
corruption campaign. 
The fear that this regime might end up stifling initiative 
and creating a more rigid government system leading 
to adverse economic outcomes is no longer a fringe 
view. The issue is not so much that economic growth is 
‘The trade war is, 
of course, about 
trade, but deep 
down, it is also 
about China’s 
technology and 
industrial policies, 
and the struggle 
for technological 
dominance in 
commercial and 
military spheres.
’
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slowing in China, but that the government is trying to sustain 
unsustainable levels of growth. To this end, there has been a 
flurry of what we might call ‘disquiet’ in China, even if open 
dissent or criticism of President Xi does not really happen 
and is seen as too risky. The trade war with the United 
States has certainly acted as a catalyst, bringing to the fore 
the writings of several notable academics and intellectuals, 
who have criticised the government for being wrong-footed 
and unprepared, for losing China’s most important external 
relationship, and, more generally, for risking uncertain and 
adverse economic outcomes.
Among the more notable criticisms written since 2018 are 
those of Tsinghua University law professor, Xu Zhangrun, who 
criticised the abandonment of presidential term limits, and 
government repression and ideology, and asserted that the 
government had lost its way in the conduct of both economic 
and foreign policy.5 Zhang Weiying, an economics professor 
at Peking University, charged that the government narrative 
attributing China’s past success and future opportunities to 
the central role of the Party, the state and top-down industrial 
policy was wrong. Instead, he argued that China’s past and 
future hope lay in marketisation, entrepreneurship and learning 
from the rest of the world.6 Other remarkable critiques have 
hailed from Professor Sheng Hong of the beleaguered Unirule 
Institute, who was critical of the government’s heavy-handed 
and party-state approach to intellectual property and to the 
institutional structures, including the rule of law, on which 
China’s science and engineering future depended.7 And also 
from Professor Xiang Songzuo of Renmin University who 
asserted that the government was not addressing critical 
shortcomings in the economy’s structure, the serial violation 
of laws and regulations, or the steady demise in the health of 
the private sector.8 
While the impetus behind market-oriented reforms has waned 
in deference to the innate preference for administrative 
directives, restrictions, quotas, and bureaucratic reforms, 
President Xi did act at the end of 2018 to offer more support 
for China’s flagging private sector, and back new lending and 
‘A more immediate 
challenge for 
Beijing is playing 
out on the streets 
of Hong Kong.... 
Yet, there is a 
myriad of reasons 
why China might 
not want to 
intervene directly.
’
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business support measures. The messaging, 
though, remains equivocal because public 
ownership and state control are also seen 
as the unquestionable cornerstone of his 
‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
for a New Era. 
DEbT
Since the financial crisis of 2015-16, the 
government has attempted to clamp down 
on the most egregious forms of financial 
risk-taking, restrict the use, and abuse, of 
credit, and has been willing to tolerate slightly 
lower growth - up to a point. Tougher ‘macro-
prudential’ financial regulations in and after 
2017 have proven to be quite effective. 
Total debt as a share of GDP remains high 
at over 300 per cent, but is now growing 
more slowly than before. So-called ‘shadow 
banking’ assets, which amounted to about 
87 per cent of GDP in 2017, dropped to about 
68 per cent of GDP in 2018. The growth 
of credit creation, running at about 17 per 
cent three years ago, had almost halved 
by 2018, though it has picked up since the 
start of 2019. 
Despite these developments, considerable 
concerns remain, not least as to whether 
the authorities have really come to terms 
with the trade-off between deleveraging and 
slower credit expansion on the one hand, and 
slower economic growth on the other. The 
ratio of debt to income in China is still rising, 
and while there has been some moderation 
in borrowing by companies, the debt burdens 
of local governments, and more recently of 
households, have been rising steadily. Some 
of the progress Chinese banks have made in 
strengthening their balance sheets by raising 
new capital and writing off some historic 
bad loans is being undone by weaker growth 
and new bad loans. Financial instability 
risks, moreover, are present in the risky ways 
in which banks fund their loans in short-
term interbank and other financial markets, 
rather than from more stable household 
and company deposits. This is especially 
true of joint stock, city commercial and rural 
banks that account for about 45 per cent of 
banking system assets. 
Two such banks, Baoshang Bank and Bank 
of Jinzhou had to be bailed out earlier this 
summer. The former was the first one 
taken over by the government for 20 years. 
Even though small, their failure raised deep 
concerns about balance sheet, counterparts 
and contagion risks, and while the authorities 
acted in a timely way, no one can be sure 
that this will always be the case. It is widely 
acknowledged that even absent a crisis, 
restructuring and recapitalising the banking 
system and weaning the economy off debt-
dependency will take several years and result 
in significantly lower economic growth. 
DEMoGRAPhICS
A longer-term challenge for China is rapid 
and premature ageing. Because of the 
interplay between weak fertility rates and 
rising life expectancy, a now common global 
phenomenon, the working age population is 
being hollowed. It started to drop in 2012, 
and the decline will gather pace in the 
2020s. By 2050, the working age population 
is predicted to fall by over 210 million, a drop 
of over 20 per cent.
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Because the retirement age for men and 
women is so low (60 for men and 50 or 55 
for women), China’s old age dependency 
rate (retirees as a share of the working age 
population) is going to soar in the next 20-
30 years. Put another way, today there are 
about 7 workers for each retiree, but by the 
2040s, this will have fallen to 2.5 workers, 
lower than it is predicted to be in the US. 
This phenomenon, unless mitigated, is 
associated with worse economic outcomes 
for growth, productivity, and the financial 
well-being of individuals, especially 
pensioners, and the state.
The weakness of the fertility rate is the key 
factor, as it is elsewhere. This has prompted 
the government to not only use rhetoric such 
as ‘have children for the country’ but to look 
at extensions to periods of maternal leave, 
and to financial incentives to encourage 
couples to have second children.
Yet these methods aren’t working. After 
17.86 million births in 2016, the figure 
dropped to 17.2 million in 2017 and 15.2 
million in 2018 – the third lowest rate after 
1949 and the 1960–61 famine. Lower 
fertility trends in China do not seem any 
more likely to reverse than in other ageing 
nations, not least because of rising income 
per head which is strongly associated with 
low fertility, and because of the steady 
decline in the population of women of child-
bearing age. The situation may be even 
more alarming and urgent than mainstream 
demographers estimate. The fertility rate 
is officially estimated to be 1.6 children per 
woman, but one expert on fertility trends 
thinks it could have been as low as 1.18 on 
average between 2010 and 2018.9 
Either way, the combination of weak fertility 
and rising longevity means that China will 
age as rapidly in the next 22 years as most 
western countries have done over 50-75 
years, and with much lower levels of income 
per head and far less sophisticated social 
programmes. Demography in the 2020s 
will accentuate for China what is already a 
complex economic outlook, and challenge 
its leadership to introduce innovative coping 
mechanisms, such as more accessible and 
cheaper childcare, a reversal of falling female 
labour force participation, higher retirement 
ages, accelerated opening of services, 
wealth redistribution and better social safety 
nets, hukou reform, and ultimately higher 
productivity growth and immigration. 
MIDDlE-InCoME TRAP
Another important challenge for China’s 
leaders in the coming years will be to avoid 
what economists call the middle-income 
trap, a concept describing the tendency 
for most countries that have grown out of 
poverty to stall in relation to their rich peers 
when they achieve middle income status. 
Premier Li Keqiang has often opined on this 
problem but with confidence that China will 
avert it. Yet, assurances are no substitute for 
the reasons that cause countries to become 
trapped. These revolve not so much around 
the capacity to innovate or accomplish 
meaningful science and engineering feats, 
as the risk of a failure of governance and 
in the development of inclusive and robust 
institutions. In other words, it is about the 
willingness of political elites to implement 
policies and reforms designed to realise 
long-term improvements in productivity.
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Empirical evidence in China demonstrates a strong 
correlation between periods when market-oriented 
reforms have been pursued with enthusiasm and high 
or accelerating productivity. These periods occurred 
in the 1980s, the early to mid-1990s, and again in the 
years preceding and following accession to the World 
Trade Organisation. In the last decade or so, the growth 
in what economists label total factor productivity has 
been no better than pedestrian, and of late, it has almost 
certainly stalled. According to most western thinking, the 
governance system in Xi’s China is not really compatible 
with the kind of institutional and political changes deemed 
necessary to jump the middle-income trap.
China, on the other hand, doesn’t see it this way. In 
fairness, it may prove to be the first state-run, illiberal 
and authoritarian country to confound our thinking about 
how to avoid the middle-income trap. Yet, the chances 
of success do not look persuasive, and the 2020s 
are likely to settle the argument one way or another. 
ThE fUTURE:  
A MoRE DIffICUlT DECADE foR ThE 
world’s sECond EConomy
At the dawn of a new decade, and ahead of the centenary 
of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, China 
has much to look back with pride and satisfaction. Yet, 
since Xi Jinping came to power, much has changed inside 
and outside China, suggesting that the 2020s for will be 
more unsettled economically, and even, brittle politically.
At home, the government’s attempts to maintain economic 
growth at an unsustainable level are already lacking 
traction because of the economy’s more limited capacity 
to carry and service high levels of debt. The confluence 
also of rapid ageing, a looming middle income trap, and 
potential currency or financial instability will sap China’s 
growth, and employment-generating capacity. 
‘At the dawn of 
a new decade, 
and ahead of 
the centenary 
of the founding 
of the Chinese 
Communist 
Party, China has 
much to look 
back with pride 
and satisfaction. 
Yet, since Xi 
Jinping came to 
power, much has 
changed inside 
and outside 
China, suggesting 
that the 2020s 
for will be more 
unsettled…. ’
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Externally, China faces a much more hostile 
economic environment as the US-China 
relationship goes through an unpredictable 
re-set, and as far as trade, and cross-border 
investment are concerned. Self-reliance may 
make for a good slogan, but the reality is 
that China remains highly dependent on US 
aggregate demand and technology, and the 
globalisation status quo.
The conventional narrative is that China 
is, or will, by 2030, be the largest economy 
in the world. Based on commonly held 
expectations historically about prewar 
Germany, the USSR and Japan, greater 
humility would not go amiss. It is not 
preordained that past economic trends 
will continue, especially in view of a much 
compromised outlook for both China and the 
rest of the world in the 2020s.
China is certain to experience slower 
economic growth in the years ahead, but 
the bigger surprise may be that, in US dollar 
terms, this narrative could be a factoid 
because of a fault-line that leads to a 
precipitous fall in the Yuan.
The Yuan is semi-pegged to the US dollar, but 
this relationship is only stable in the medium-
term if monetary policy keeps the growth of 
domestic assets in a tight relationship with 
the growth in foreign currency reserves. 
Otherwise the excess of domestic liquidity 
might seep abroad and overwhelm the 
reserves. In China, domestic liquidity is 
growing at about 10 per cent per year, while 
reserves are stable or as some believe, 
masking persistent capital outflows. If these 
trends continue, it is quite likely that the Yuan 
semi-peg will snap in the next few years. 
Emerging country experience informs us that 
when this happens, typical depreciations are 
20-40 per cent, and invariably followed by 
a recession. A fall of this magnitude would 
keep China’s GDP, measured in US dollars, 
firmly below that of the US. We should not be 
surprised, therefore, if China’s GDP relative 
to the US in 5-10 years is not so different 
compared with what it is today. 
In that event, the perception of China’s 
relative position and prospects in the world 
would be quite different from what is now 
presumed. China itself might be more 
inclined to focus on the key enablers of 
higher productivity, and living standards, and 
environmentally and commercially sound 
public spending. Governments, corporate 
strategists, and international relations 
analysts, would have to re-examine their 
assumptions and implications about China’s 
narrative and trajectory.  
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The conventional narrative is that China is, or will, 
by 2030, be the largest economy in the world. Based 
on commonly held expectations historically about 
prewar Germany, the USSR and Japan, greater 
humility would not go amiss. It is not preordained 
that past economic trends will continue, especially in 
view of a much compromised outlook for both China 
and the rest of the world in the 2020s.
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